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There is a wide variety of institutional arrange-
ments for determining the stance of monetary 
policy around the world. One of the key dif-
ferences among systems concerns the extent to 
which such decisions are made by career central 
bankers (insiders) or those outside the central 
banking fraternity (outsiders). Some countries 
operate at one extreme on this spectrum, with 
close control by either central bank insiders or 
decisions made by politicians. But many locate 
somewhere in the middle.
A case in point is the Bank of England 
Monetary Policy Committee (MPC), which is 
studied here. Decisions are delegated to a com-
mittee comprising five internal members, who 
have full-time executive positions in the Bank, 
and four external members who work mostly 
part time and have no executive responsibili-
ties. Each month, all members of the commit-
tee are briefed by Bank of England staff, after 
which they meet for a private discussion and 
subsequently vote on interest rate decisions. The 
outcome is determined by majority rule and the 
votes are subsequently made public.
ExpErtisE and MacroEconoMic policy †
Insiders versus Outsiders in Monetary Policymaking
By Timothy Besley, Neil Meads, and Paolo Surico*
There are two reasons why the composition 
of monetary policy committees could matter for 
policy. The first is due to the process for selec-
tion of its members—those who come up as 
insiders have different backgrounds and skills. 
In the case of the Bank of England, appointment 
to the position is also formally different for the 
internal and external members. The second is 
due to member incentives. External members 
leave the committee after their terms, while the 
internal members may be building their careers 
in central banking. If career concerns affect 
incentives, we would expect this to play out 
quite differently for each group.
This paper looks at the voting patterns of 
internal and external members of the MPC 
to investigate how great are the differences 
between insiders and outsiders. We make three 
contributions. First, we assess the extent to 
which the Bank of England’s internally gener-
ated forecasts explain the MPC members’ vot-
ing decisions. This is important, as generating 
forecasts on a quarterly basis is a key part of the 
process used by the Bank of England. The fore-
cast for inflation is made public in the Inflation 
Report, while the output gap forecast is not. 
Second, we use a random coefficient method of 
estimation in which the parameters of the inter-
est rate rule are allowed, but not required, to dif-
fer across members. Third, we find evidence of 
some heterogeneity in the intercept, a measure 
of experience on the MPC and the interest rate 
smoothing parameter, but no significant differ-
ences in the members’ reaction to the forecasts 
of inflation and output gaps.
Our paper is related to a growing empiri-
cal literature covering the voting record of the 
MPC. Petra Gerlach-Kristen (2003, 2007), 
Arnab Bhattacharjee and Sean Holly (2006), and 
Christopher Spencer (2006a) assess the extent 
of dissent among members. Stephen Hansen 
and Michael McMahon (2008) find that exter-
nals break away from internals after gaining 
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 committee experience. Charlotta Groth and 
Tracy Wheeler (2008) contrast the frequency 
of policy changes at individual and committee 
levels. Simon Hix, Bjorn Hoyland, and Nick 
Vivyan (2007) investigate the link between 
government spending and MPC appointments. 
Charles Goodhart (2005) estimates aggregate 
reaction functions for the MPC as a whole.
In recent studies, Spencer (2006b) and 
Alessandro Riboni and Francisco Ruge-Murcia 
(2007) offer analyses most similar in spirit to 
those of our paper, estimating individual reac-
tion functions. There are important differences, 
however, in our approach, including the use of 
the Bank of England inflation and output gaps 
forecast and the random coefficient estima-
tion method, which explicitly recognizes the 
dynamic nature of the panel of the MPC voting 
record.
I.  Specifications and Results
This section presents the specifications and 
the estimates of aggregate and individual inter-
est rate rules.
A. Pooled versus Individual Policy Rules
The rule proposed by John B. Taylor (1993) 
postulates that the policy rate responds to devia-
tions of inflation and output from the inflation 
target and the potential output. The policy rules 
employed in the empirical literature are typi-
cally variations of the simple formulation by 
Taylor.
In line with the current practice in monetary 
policymaking, the central bank tries to close 
the gap between targets and targeted variables. 
Policy is typically forward looking in that fore-
casts rather than current values matter for the 
interest rate decision. Consistent with earlier 
contributions, the movement in the policy rate 
necessary to close the gap is assumed to be 
gradual, in the form of sequences of small steps 
in the same direction. Thus, we allow for inter-
est rate smoothing by introducing the lagged 
interest rate as a regressor.
This treatment of interest rate smoothing is 
partly a semantic issue, and merely reflects an 
empirical regularity still in search of a defini-
tive explanation. One view is that the lagged 
dependent variable reflects learning about the 
evolution of unobserved states, such as, for 
instance, the natural rate of interest.1 Other, not 
mutually exclusive, views include that interest 
rate smoothing captures the Brainard principle 
of caution in the face of uncertainty about the 
structure of the economy or serial correlation in 
the error terms.
In the context of dynamic heterogeneous 
 panels, Hashem M. Pesaran and Ron Smith 
(1995) show that when coefficients differ across 
groups, the estimates of long-run relationships 
can be severely biased if the regressors are 
highly persistent, as they are in our dataset.2 In 
particular, the coefficient on the lagged depen-
dent variable is biased toward one, while the 
short-run coefficients of the other variables are 
biased toward zero.
A typical aggregate Taylor rule takes the fol-
lowing form:
(1)  it 5 a 1 bEt21 5pt1h 2 p*6
 1 gEt21 5xt1k6 1 rit21 1 et ,
where the policy instrument, it , is a short-term 
interest rate, 1pt 2 p*2 and xt represent devia-
tions of inflation and output from their reference 
values; and h and k denote the relevant fore-
cast horizons for inflation and the output gap, 
respectively.
Before proceeding, a word of caution is 
needed on the interpretation of our estimates. 
It is not suggested that monetary policy in the 
United Kingdom or any other country is, in fact, 
conducted by reference to such rules. Rather, 
aggregate and individual versions of (1) are sim-
ply a convenient representation of movements in 
the short-term interest rate.
As we are interested in individual heteroge-
neity, a more flexible alternative to the aggregate 
Taylor rule is a reaction function where param-
eters are allowed to vary across MPC members. 
If only the intercept changes with the N MPC 
members, then we have a Fixed Effect (FE) 
1 As different members may have different views on the 
state of the economy, the unobserved variable rationale for 
interest rate smoothing corroborates the use of heteroge-
neous policy rules.
2 The sum of the autoregressive parameters in an AR(p) 
process, a widely used measure of persistence, is 0.83 for 
the inflation forecast and 0.86 for the output gap forecast, 
with p 5 6.
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model which, with a slight abuse of notation, we 
write as follows:
(2)  ij, t 5 aj 1 bEt21 5pt1h 2 p*6
 1 gEt21 5xt1k6 1 rit21 1 ej, t ,
with j 5 1, … , N. If the inflation and the output 
gap slopes are also member specific, then we have 
the Random Coefficient (RC) specification:
(3)  ij, t 5 aj 1 bj Et21 5pt1h 2 p*6
 1 gj Et21 5xt1k6 1 rj it21 1 hj, t .
In the remainder of the paper, we assess the 
ability of individual reaction functions to cap-
ture heterogeneity in the voting patterns of MPC 
members.3
B. Estimates
In Table 1, we report estimates of the three 
specifications using the Bank of England’s fore-
casts for inflation and output gaps. The forecasts 
are based on the constant interest rate projec-
tions reported in the Inflation Report, a quar-
terly publication issued by the Bank of England 
around the middle of each February, May, 
August, and November. We prefer to use con-
stant, as opposed to market-based, interest rates 
because the former are not influenced by the 
private sector expectations on the future path of 
policy rates.
The parameters h and k are set, respectively, to 
2 and 12 months. A two-year horizon for infla-
tion is often referred to in the Inflation Report. 
And, a one-year horizon for output is consistent 
with the extensive VAR evidence on the lags of 
3 Although the specification is fairly general in the way it 
allows for heterogeneity between committee members, we 
assume that the forecasts are held in common.
 The MPC meets at the beginning of the month and 
therefore the inflation forecast is signed off after the 
monthly policy decision is taken. To avoid any possible 
endogeneity between inflation forecasts and interest rate 
decisions, we assume that, at the beginning of each month t, 
policymakers observe only the forecasts available up to the 
end of the previous month, t 2 1. Data on the output gap 
forecast are confidential. The quarterly forecasts are inter-
polated to obtain monthly series.
the monetary policy transmission mechanism 
(see, for instance, Lawrence Christiano, Martin 
Eichenbaum, and Charles Evans 1999).
The historical data on individual interest 
rate votes are available online at http://www.
bankofengland.co.uk/monetarypolicy/mpcvot-
ing.xls.5 The sample, between the establishment 
of the MPC in May 1997 and July 2007, cov-
ers a period of 122 meetings and 19 members 
for a total of 971 observations. We consider only 
members with at least two years of experience 
on the MPC.6
In column 1, we report the estimates of the 
aggregate Taylor rule (1), while in column 2 we 
show the estimates of the fixed-effects model 
(2).7 When the time dimension is 30 and the 
cross section 20, Judson and Owen (1999) show 
that the small-sample bias associated with the 
GMM estimator proposed by Manuel Arellano 
and Stephen Bond (1991) is similar in magni-
tude to the bias of the FE model. For complete-
ness, in column 3, we present the results for the 
Arellano-Bond (AB) method using two lags of 
the variables as instruments for the current val-
ues. In columns  and 5, we present the Swamy 
GLS random-coefficient estimates of model (3).
In the last column, the individual Taylor rules 
are augmented with a dummy variable change, 
taking values of one, zero, and minus one 
depending on whether the change in the policy 
rate in the previous meeting was upward, zero, 
or downward. Unlike the interest rate–smooth-
ing term, ij, t21, which captures the individual 
persistence in the voting records, the variable 
change captures the extent to which individual 
interest rate decisions depend on the past inter-
est rate decision of the committee as a whole.8 
5 Whenever not specified in the dataset, we assume that 
the magnitude of the individual votes is 25 basis points.
6 To capture any possible time trend, we augment the 
specifications with a proxy for experience, measured as 
the number of months that each member has been on the 
MPC since her/his first mandate. The estimates of the coef-
ficients on the proxy for experience are not reported but 
are available upon request. The current governor’s voting 
record is divided into two time periods—before and after 
his appointment as governor.
7 The average time dimension of our unbalanced panel is 
5 observations, and we  consider only those members who 
attended at least 2 consecutive meetings. This implies that 
the size of the Nickell bias should be small (see Ruth Judson 
and Ann Owen 1999).
8 Drawing a parallel with habits in the consumption 
literature, we will refer to internal or external smoothing 
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Testing for internal versus external smoothing is 
a further advantage of the RC specification.
A number of interesting results emerge from 
Table 1. First, consistent with the analytical 
results in Pesaran and Smith (1995) on the biases 
of pooled regression estimates in dynamic het-
erogeneous panels, the coefficient on the lagged 
dependent variable is significantly lower using 
the RC model.9 Second, the inflation forecast 
has most explanatory power in the FE and RC 
specifications, suggesting that an efficient use of 
the cross-section information yields more accu-
rate estimates.10 Third, the estimate of b based 
on the RC specification in column  is signifi-
cantly higher than the estimate based on the AB 
method in column 3.
The coefficient on the output gap is always 
negative, though it is never statistically differ-
ent from zero.11 The intercept is statistically 
depending on whether individual decisions depend on the 
individual or aggregate lagged interest rate.
9 As the inflation and output gaps are stationary vari-
ables, both in the theory and in the data, the apparent near-
unit root in the nominal interest rate is likely due to the 
small sample.
10 We also experiment with a more general specification 
in which individual members are allowed, but not required, 
to respond to both current inflation and the inflation fore-
cast. The parameter on current inflation is not statistically 
different from zero, and the parameter on the inflation fore-
cast is virtually identical to the estimates in Table 1.
11 It should be noted that the estimates of g do not imply 
that the output gap is irrelevant for the policy decision. 
Rather, they imply that the output gap is not a target per 
se and is important only to the extent it helps to forecast 
future inflation. Using HP-filtered real GDP, we find some 
 significant at the 1 percent confidence level only 
in the RC columns, suggesting that the pooled 
estimates may be biased toward zero. The null of 
parameter constancy is strongly rejected in the 
estimation of the random coefficient models.
The estimate of lchange is highly significant, 
implying that after a policy change, dissenters 
have a tendency to vote in line with the rest of 
the committee. The exact interpretation of this 
finding is worthy of further investigation. A 
comparison with the estimates of r in column 5, 
however, reveals that internal smoothing is far 
more important than external smoothing.
In Figure 1, we plot 90 percent confidence 
intervals for the estimates of the individual 
parameters behind the RC results in column 5. 
The long-run coefficients are computed as aj/ 11 
2 rj 2 , bj / 11 2 rj 2 , and gj / 11 2 rj 2 , and they 
capture the (preferred) long-run level of the real 
interest rate and the cumulative responses of the 
nominal interest rate to a 1 percent deviation of 
inflation and output from the reference values. 
Standard errors are computed using the delta 
method.
In each column, the 19 estimates of the indi-
vidual long-run coefficients are reported three 
times, according to alternative dimensions of 
heterogeneity. The dashed lines refer to mem-
bers appointed as internal (first row), members 
with working experience in the Treasury prior 
evidence of a significant response to output, but the magni-
tude of the coefficient is about nine times smaller than the 
magnitude of the coefficient on the inflation forecast.
Table 1—Taylor Rule Estimates112 122 132 12 152
Aggregate FE AB RC RC
r 0.985*** 0.9877*** 0.9658*** 0.895*** 0.8968***10.0182 10.00592 10.0051722 10.017012 10.0152
b 0.333 0.009*** 0.1509*** 0.3219*** 0.2399***10.2002 10.0392 10.0152 10.0592 10.06172
g 20.00289 20.0065 20.0071 20.010 20.0081110.01852 10.0052 10.00962 10.02052 10.016332
lchange 0.0757***10.01882
a 0.089 0.0076 -0.00003 0.5200*** 0.5027***10.0802 10.03932 10.000712 10.10602 10.09012
Obs 122 971 952 971 971
# groups 930,925 19 19 19 19
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p , 0.01, ** p , 0.05, * p , 0.1.
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to the appointment (second row) and members 
with working experience in academia prior to 
the appointment (third row). To preserve ano-
nymity in the individual regressions, numbers 
are randomly assigned to MPC members within 
each group and across columns.
The main conclusion we draw from Figure 1 
and formal hypothesis testing is that there is lit-
tle evidence that the heterogeneity reported in 
Table 1 is associated with the three types of het-
erogeneity that we have considered.12 Moreover, 
inspection of the panels in the middle column 
reveals that the long-run responses to the inflation 
12 Wald tests fail to reject the null-hypothesis of param-
eter constancy across the GLS mean group estimates for all 
pairs of long-run coefficients except the intercepts of the 
gap are fairly homogenous, independent of the 
group split. Altogether, our results suggest that 
individual (unobserved) characteristics different 
from belonging to the groups “internal,” “trea-
sury,” and “academia” are responsible for the 
heterogeneity in the MPC voting patterns.
II.  Conclusions
The results presented here do suggest evi-
dence of heterogeneity in the decisions made at 
the Bank of England MPC. However, the reac-
tions to the forecasts of inflation and output gaps 
treasury/non-treasury classification at the 5 percent confi-
dence level and the output gap coefficients of the academics/
non-academics classification at the 1 percent confidence level.
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Figure 1. Confidence Bands for Long-Run Coefficients in Individual Taylor Rules
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appear fairly homogenous, with no significant 
differences between members according to their 
internal/external status, academic background, 
or experience working in the Treasury. Our esti-
mates suggest that inflation forecasts generally 
predict the behavior of all committee mem-
bers. However, there is less consistent evidence 
of responses to the forecasts of the output gap. 
While these forecasts are ultimately the respon-
sibility of the MPC, they reflect a collective 
process involving the input of Bank staff. The 
findings reinforce the role that such forecasting 
can play in shaping policy decisions.
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